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CASE COMMENTS
STATUTES: THE SILENCE OF CONGRESS
United States v. South Buffalo Ry., 68 Sup. Ct. 868 (1948)
The Government sued for a perpetual injunction against the South
Buffalo Railway Company, the Bethlehem Steel Company, an affiliated
subsidiary, and the Bethlehem Steel Corporation, the holding company.
This suit, based upon the commodities clause of the Interstate Commerce
Act,1 which prohibits railroads from transporting any article or commodity,
with certain exceptions, in which it may have an interest, was an attempt
to restrain the railroad from transporting commodities produced by the
subsidiary or holding company of the railroad. In United States v. Elgin,
Joliet and Eastern Ry. Co.,2 the Court permitted a railroad to carry goods
of a company although both the railroad and the company were sub-
sidiaries of a holding company owning all of the railroad stock. In 1939,
in an effort to nullify the effect of the Elgin case, an amendment to the
commodities clause was introduced in the Senate, but it was not adopted.
On direct appeal,5 the Government's contention being that the Elgin
case should not be followed, HELD, that, irrespective of the correctness of
the Court's former construction of the commodities clause, when Con-
gress has failed to adopt a proposed amendment calculated to nullify
that construction, the .former ruling prevails. Judgment affirmed, Jus-
tices Rutiedge, Black, Douglas, and Murphy dissenting.
A conclusive presumption of legislative adoption of previous judicial 4
and administrative 5 constructions of a statute generally arises from re-
enactment of the statute without any substantial change, from the rejec-
tion of proposed amendments to the statute and from legislative silence
concerning past constructions of a statute,6 so as to bar the Court from
overruling its prior decisions. This presumption, however, is not con-
134 STAT. 585 (1906), 49 U. S. C. §1(8) (1940).
'298 U. S. 492, 56 Sup. Ct. 841, 80 L. Ed. 1300 (1936).
'32 STAT. 823 (1903), 49 U. S. C. §45 (1940).
'United States v. Ryan, 284 U. S. 167, 52 Sup. Ct. 65, 76 L. Ed. 224 (1931);
Bruce v. Tobin, 254 U. S. 18, 38 Sup. Ct. 7, 62 L. Ed. 123 (1917); Savings Bank v.
United States, 19 Wall. 227, 22 L. Ed. 80 (U. S. 1873); Depfer v. Walker, 125 Fla.
189, 169 So. 660 (1936); CRAwroRD, CoNsTRucTION or STATUTES §233 (1940); 2
SUTEERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §15109 (3d ed. 1943).
'Brown, Regulations, Reenactment, and the Revenue Act, 54 HARv. L. Rv. 377
(1941); Griswold, A Summary of the Regulation Problem, 54 Haav. L. Ra,. 398 (1941).
'Note, 59 HA v. L. REV. 1277 (1946).
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clusive under all circumstances, and some decisions have considered it
merely as an aid to statutory construction 7 and only one of the factors to
determine the meaning of the language. 8 In Girouard v. United States,9
the Court took the position that reenactment, in and of itself, does not give
rise to a presumption of legislative ratification of judicial constructions
of the subject statute, but that, in addition, there must be very persuasive
evidence of legislative adoption of those prior constructions before the
Court will be barred from overruling a former decision.' 0 The principal
decision," however, adheres to the traditional rule, which considers the
presumption as conclusive.'
2
The proposed amendment to the commodities clause purported to in-
clude within the prohibition of the clause not only subsidiaries and
affiliates of a carrier but also all legal persons that in fact are controlling
the carrier, the purpose of the amendment being to set aside the effect
of the Elgin decision and to recognize the carrier as a mere alter ego'
3
of the holding company. The proposal, instead of applying to railroads
alone, however, would have applied to all carriers other than those trans-
porting by air. The Senate committee rejected the rewritten clause as
"too drastic," but did not indicate whether their disapproval was based
at least in part on the extension to all carriers or solely on that portion
concerning carriers' affiliates.
The Court was apparently unanimous in indicating that the statute
originally had been misconstrued,' 4 but it divided on the interpretation
of the subsequent legislative history.' 5 The majority understood the
debates in the Senate committee and the refusal to adopt the amendment
'Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U. S. 118, 62 Sup. Ct. 139, 86 L. Ed. 100
(1941) ; Helvering v. Reynolds, 313 U. S. 428, 61 Sup. Ct. 971, 85 L. Ed. 409 (1941);
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 60 Sup. Ct. 444, 84 L. Ed. 604 (1940).
8F. C. C. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 311 U. S. 132, 61 Sup. Ct. 152, 85 L.
Ed. 87 (1940).
'328 U. S. 61, 66 Sup. Ct. 826, 90 L. Ed. 1084 (1946); Horack, Congressional
Silence-a Tool of Judicial Supremacy, 25 TEX. L. REv. 247 (1947).
"See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U. S. 14, 21, 67 Sup. Ct. 13, 16, 91 L. Ed. 12,
18 (1946) (concurring opinion).
"United States v. South Buffalo Ry., 68 Sup. Ct. 868 (1948).
"Cases cited note 6 supra.
"WORMSER, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity in THE DIsRFGARO OF THE
CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED CORPORATE PROBLEMS 42 (1927).
"See United States v. South Buffalo Ry., 68 Sup. Ct. 868, 870 (1948).
"Hearings before Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 2009, 76th Cong.,
1st Sess. 427 (1946).
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